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1 Is Economic Growth Enough?
Poverties and the State
The recent pre-eminence of neo-liberal views of
development casts doubt on previous genres of
poverty literature. If a rising tide raises all ships, the
legitimacy of politically difficult, fiscally burden-
some and administratively complex schemes for
the poor is called into question. This challenge for
students of the South Asian subcontinent - which
contains a large share of the world absolute poor
- was recently posed by the World Bank study,
India: Achievements and Challenges in Reducing
Poverty (1997). That study concluded that eco-
nomic growth has been the major factor reducing
poverty, despite a complicated array of anti-poverty
schemes. Second, liberalisation is held to be the
major reason for growth. Growth is to provide the
resources needed for public safety nets and invest-
ment in human capital which round out the desir-
able poverty reduction scenario. The clear
prescription is growth encouragement as the major
anti-poverty mechanism; the rest (safety nets,
human capital) is desirable if affordable.
Though the percentage of poor in India's population
has declined by various measures since
Independence, in absolute numbers the long trajec-
tory has been an increase in poverty, with strong
regional variation: by World Bank estimates, from
164 million poor in 1951 to 312 million (about 35%
of the population) in 19 93-94. Consistent with con-
ventional wisdom celebrating the Kerala model,' the
Bank notes (1997: y): 'The range in poverty reduc-
tion among states is so wide that Kerala's progress in
lowering the headcount index of poverty (2.4% per
year, on average, between 1957-58 and 1993-94) is
more than 120 times that of Bihar and more than
four times that of Rajasthan'. One implication is that
we should understand Kerala better: what, for exam-
ple, separates it from Bihar and Rajasthan? One
curiosity, given the Bankb overall emphasis on
growth, is that Kerala does so well given that its eco-
nomic growth rate has been quite anaemic (Kannan
and Pushpangadan 1988; Tharamangalam 1998).
The literature is enormous; for a representative range
of positive and critical commentary, see, for example,
Drèze and Sen 1989, pp. 221ff et passim; Parayil 1996;
Heller 1994, chapter 1; Mencher 1980; Herring 1980;
Tharamangalam 1998; Jeffrey 1993. The 'model' has
become so ubiquitous that Vice-President Al Gore of the
United States called Kerala a 'stunning success story'.
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About 80% of India's poverty is rural (World Bank
1997: xiii). By class, agricultural workers are espe-
cially likely to be poor; landlessness remains the
major cause of poverty Kerala's comparatively good
performance in poverty reduction certainly could
not have happened without land reform and the
correlates of land reform - rural worker organisa-
tion, rights and policy protections - which collec-
tively make up agrarian reform.
The World Bank report begins with a familiar com-
parison: India has fared badly in growth and
poverty reduction in comparison with South East
Asia (p. xiii), Indonesia is taken as a contrasting
model: an annual decline in poverty of 10%
between 1970 and 1993, from 58% to 8% of the
population. These kinds of lessons age quickly The
Asian economic collapse beginning in July 1997
clearly had a more dramatic impact on nations fol-
lowing the neo-lïberal path than on India, where
there has been significant resistance and halting
compliance on reform (Herring, in press). Poverty
is created very quickly in general economic col-
lapse; press reports now count the poor in
Indonesia at 100 million. It is not clear how long
the newly poor in Indonesia will remain so, nor
how far back along the historical line of poverty
reduction the current situation has moved because
of economic collapse.
Cross-national macro comparisons dominate the
development literature. But it is diffïcult to assess
the real validity of their pseudo-precise measures
and finely tuned conclusions about poverty
Michael Lipton notes (1997: 1004) that 'disparities
between successive PPP [purchasing-power parity[
measures, and between all such measures and
national accounts data, are sometimes huge and
unexplained'. For example:
An extreme case is China: the move from Penn
5.1 to Penn 5.6 conversions drastically cut the
estimate of China's purchasing power, so that the
Though the World Bank study of India (1997)
concludes that their results 'clearly refute any
presumption of "immiserizing growth," Gaiha and
KulkarnPs panel data from Maharashtra (1998: Table 1)
indicate significant fractions of village population who
either were poor and became poorer or were non-poor
and became poor despite aggregate growth. It seems
unlikely that the Bank position has sufficiently
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estimate of poverty incidence ... in the early
1990s tripled overnight, from about 9% of the
population to 29%. China's estimated poverty
reduction record, too, is made to look worse:
economic growth since 1980 on PPP 5.6 is about
half that recorded in the national accounts.
Errors of this magnitude seriously undermine the
confidence we can place in the macro-comparative
literature on relationships between development
strategy writ large and poverty The ethical implica-
tion is that policy which produces direct and know-
able results in poverty reduction - agrarian reform,
for example - should have precedence over meth-
ods whose effects are indirect, uncertain, difficult to
assess (Herring 1983: chapters 9,10).
Economic growth which alleviates poverty arguably
works better in relatively egalitarian settings, which
are themselves more amenable to growth (Lipton
1997). Further, whatever the effects of growth,
there will be a role for public intervention to allevi-
ate particular forms of poverty and to address con-
centrations of people passed over or harmed2 by
growth processes. Public intervention by states
catering to unreconstructed elite dominance are less
likely to play those roles well compared to states
reacting to a field of power in which there is more
voice among the weakest sectors. Given the politi-
cal uncertainties of emergence or sustainability of a
pro-poor coalition under conditions of rapid
growth, direct and knowable results should have
precedence over speculation and hope. Agrarian
reform has a strong record in terms of trajectories of
states which have grown rapidly and with some
equality (e.g. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan). The
'new consensus' on growth and poverty suffers from
technical and conceptual problems,3 but to the
extent that it concentrates on labour-intensive
growth in situations of relatively equal asset distrib-
ution, it is not inconsistent with agrarian reform. To
the extent that it assumes safety-nets and pro-poor
programmes funded from the surplus created from
disaggregated and reliable data to make the sweeping
claim above. The Bank position cannot be literally true;
there are always victims of economic change, whatever
the net vector sum: cf. John Sidel on violence against
the poor who stood in the way of expansion in growth
sectors of the Philippines (1998).
See Lipton (1997). On these problems in the Bank
1997 report, see Gaiha and Kulkarni 1998.
ag,gressive capitalism, it is naive political economy
(cf. Drèze and Sen 1989). Advocates for the poor
are probably ill-advised to depend on altruism of
the new rich.
Comparison of the United States with contempo-
rary India may seem strained, hut it is informative;
our propensity to think in static categories (e.g.
Third World') misses some interesting longitudinal
comparisons. The emergence of the United States
from its underdeveloped agrarian origins is histori-
cally recent. Failures in Reconstruction in the
United States are as suggestive as positive effects of
reform in Kerala.
2 Failure of 'Reconstruction' in
the Southern United States
The Southern slave population after emancipation
was as intractable a problem of poverty as one can
imagine: uneducated, socially despised and frac-
tured, without contacts or assets. The period after
the Civil War in the United States (1865-77) is
called the 'Reconstruction', reflecting (in retrospect)
more the pious hope of reformers than capacity The
greatest challenge was to reconstruct society As in
post-World War II Japan, land reforms were seen at
the time as a mechanism to break the economic
back of a militaristic gentry and create a new base of
support for a democratic state.
The rumouredlpromised land reform came under
the slogan 'forty acres and a mule'. That amount of
agricultural capital would in many parts of the
South have afforded subsistence. But no bill sur-
vived in Congress. To the contrary, experiments in
land redistribution in the South under martial
law were dismantled after military occupation by
For argument, see Echeverri-Gent 1993; n agrarian
structure in the South more generally, Goodwyn 1976.
Echeverri-Gent notes that the southern United States,
particularly in the 1930s, exhibited social-structural
similarities with rural India: a caste-like system political-
economic oppression and marginalisation, high rates of
dependency of labourers, share-tenants and marginal
farmers, small-scale labour intensive agriculture,
extortionate sharecropping, credit exploitation and
extensive poverty. Politics was characterised by 'elite
domination, intra-party factionalism, agrarian populism'
(p. 76).
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federal troops ended. Land reform under martial
law, which worked fairly well in Japan after World
War II, was abandoned as an option. Not only did
redistribution not become law, but even preferen-
tial distribution of public lands in favour of freed-
men (as opposed to railroad companies) failed as
well (Foner 1989: 451). With the departure of fed-
eral troops, Southern elites re-established rule
with terror, fraud, intimidation and economic
power. In the aftermath of failed Reconstruction,
backsliding in land policy - then entirely in the
hands of state governments - reduced the limited
gains of reform and produced for blacks in partic-
ular an agrarian system rivalling that of the more
extreme cases of landlord rule in the South Asian
subcontinent.
Because the landed elite retained economic power,
and eventually returned to rule, efforts to resurrect
a subject class had no base. The failure of
Reconstruction left in place an agrarian political
economy of bi-modal subjugation and dominance,
largely coterminous with race, but affecting the
white agrarian poor as well. WE.B. Du Bois
remarked that 'the slave went free; stood a brief
moment in the sun; then moved back again toward
slavery' (in Foner 1989: 602).
The failure in political terms meant that the
Thermidor period following Reconstruction saw
steady erosion of black rights: restrictions on the
rights of former slaves to vote, be admitted to equal
public schools or fully participate in dominant
institutions of public or civil society5 Prosterman
and Riedinger's comparative study of land reform
concludes more generally that reforms 'provide a
village-level underpinning that reinforces the
national-level freedoms rather than contradicts
North Carolina's Landlord and Tenant Act of 1877 gave
the landlords so much unilateral power that one former
slave complained that the landlord had been made 'the
court, sheriff and jury'. Likewise, policy towards the
commons restricted access by the landless, a policy first
invoked in areas of greatest black concentration of
population (Foner 1989: 594-95).
For a sustained argument on the relation between
land reform, citizenship and democratic development,
see Prosterman and Riedinger (1987). On the political
consequences of this period in the United States, see
Bense (1990). For an argument linking land ownership
to independent social activism among Southern blacks
in the 1960s, see Salamon (1979).
them' (1987: 232). Of special importance for the
long trajectory of poverty, human capital develop-
ment was restricted; social safety nets and educa-
tional facilities remained comparatively
underdeveloped in the South generally, and espe-
cially for blacks, into the contemporary period.
Land policy from Washington failed as a lever ïn
reconstructing the South, but left behind antipathy
to intervention by the federal government so severe
that military force was required in the 1950s to
enforce court orders to enrol blacks in public
schools.
To the extent that racism (or caste7) explains some
share of povertyb persistence, the implications of
Reconstructionb failure are profound. Eric Foner
(1989: 604) writes:
Reconstructionb demise and the emergence of
blacks as a disenfranchised class of dependent
labourers greatly facilitated racism further
spread, until by the early twentieth century it
had become more deeply embedded in the
nations culture and politics than at any time
since the beginning of the antislavery crusade
and perhaps in our entire history
The effects were not merely economic, but linked to
systematic oppression. Education was systemati-
cally denied blacks and educational qualifications
were used as tests for eligibility to vote. The World
Bank's World Development Report 1990 rightly
stressed the importance of education as one means
of promoting opportunity for the landless to escape
poverty
Land reform by itself would not have solved the
economic, much less social and political problems
of former slaves, but there is evidence that it would
have made a difference. Foner (1989: 109) notes
that 'well ïnto the twentieth century blacks who did
acquire land were more likely to register, vote, and
run for office than other members of the rural com-
munity' But 'as things turned out, blacks lacked
even the partial shield against economic exploita-
tion afforded by ownership of land' (p. 110).
Subsequent evidence from the differential trajectory
Gaiha and Kulkarni (1998) found that caste in India
constituted 'a significant effect on movement out of
poverty' (p. 17). They attribute this result to
discrimination in specific markets or weak motivation
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of different classes of black farmers likewise indi-
cates that the counter-factual argument is strong.
Lester Salamon's (1979: 129) work on the effects of
New Deal experiments in land distribution indi-
cates the consequences of missing this historical
moment in the South. Landless black tenants who
benefited from very limited and truncated land dis-
tribution in the 1930s created 'a permanent middle
class that ultimately emerged in the 1960s as the
backbone of the civil-rights movement in the rural
South'.
There are macro-political implications for poverty
policy When radical agrarian populism swept
through the South in the l890s, disenfranchised
blacks were not politically available for a bi-racial
coalition that might have altered the national distri-
bution of power (Goodwyn 1976). Eric Foner
(1989: 604) argues that the failure of
Reconstruction led directly to one-party (and
white) dominance in the 'Solïd South' which
'helped define the contours of American politics
and weaken the prospects not simply of change in
racial matters but of progressive legislation in many
other realms'. The failure to break local landed
power in the South had the further pernicious con-
sequence of creating suspicion of policy from
Washington and a blind allegiance to 'states rights'
The irony of contemporary development thinking is
that celebration of devolution and decentralisation
validates precisely the structure that kept oppres-
sion alive in the Southern United States (Herring
1998).
Keralab experience suggests that processes leading
up to agrarian reform have a significant impact on
the transformation of subjects to citizens. This
transformation puts pressure on political systems
for redistributive public policy Kerala is a social
democracy on a sub-national scale, with all the
warts and messy politics of any democracy; every
political formation must address the poor. That
democracy owes its form in large part to decades of
both pursuit and final implementation of radical
agrarian reforms.
(internalised identification); it may also, ¡ would think,
reflect the variable distribution of connections: it is
easier to get a job, a loan, any advantage, if one has
caste fellows in positions to help.
3 The Kerala Model
A common response by agricultural workers to my
question of what pre-land reform days were like in
Palakkad district of Kerala State was: 'we were
slaves' (wilma). The core of agrarian reforms, finally
implemented in the 1970s, was the abolition of
landlordism as a social system (Herring 1980). The
long process began with ratcheted episodes of pop-
ular reaction to agrarian reforms beginning with the
Malabar Tenancy Act of 1929. It is this process -
not simply the effective date of legislation - to
which the argument below refers.
Kerala has been celebrated as a purposive, direct, Pol-
icy-driven poverty reduction success story in contrast
to much of the subcontinent. By objective measures of
human welfare - mortality, longevity, literacy,
malefemale population ratio - Kerala is anomalous
for the level of per capita income (below the mean for
India) and for the rate of growth in agricultural pro-
duction (below the mean for India).8 Poverty reduc-
tion has been achieved via land reforms, labour
reforms and transfer payments. All three presupposed
an effective political and administrative system and
popular pressure on the state, centrally involving the
long process of mobilisation that produced both land
reform and labour reform in the 1970s.
For reasons now quite familiar9, redistribution of
land rights (not necessarily patches of soil) should
have positive effects on growth and justice. Food
security via public channels complements agrarian
reform as anti-poverty policy in Kerala. A relatively
extensive welfare profile by sub-continental stan-
dards complements food security more narrowly
conceived. Such programmes presuppose a political
system with both capacity and will. Anti-poverty
values are embedded in real institutions and
guarded and refreshed by participation. It is recog-
nised that redistributive policies require extraordi-
nary public support. The operation of ration
shops and feeding programmes in Kerala rein-
forces the conclusion that popular participation
This claim is not meant to ignore the points about
history raised in the debate between Amartya Sen and
Surjit Bhalla (Srinivasan and Bardhan 1988); certain
improvements in social welfare predate land reform. lt is
more useful to see land reform as the culmination of a
process that spawned caste reform, educational reform,
altered priorities in social welfare spending and labour
reform.
17
and consciousness are necessary conditions for
effective pro-poor distributive public policy
What the Kerala experience underscores, and does
not really resolve, is the problem of the most awk-
ward class: the agricultural labourers (e.g. Mencher
1980, Herring 1980; 1989). Income gains from
more rapid growth are uncertain, lagged and
unevenly distributed among households and over
time. Problems of the labourers in Kerala were
addressed primarily through distribution of home-
stead plots - which are intensively used and quite
important both nutritionally and commercially -
and secondarily through limited distribution of sur-
plus lands from the land reform and public lands.
Where there is a great deal of low productivity or
degraded land in either public or private hands, this
strategy is effective, given appropriate environmen-
tal oversight.
If it is politically impossible to redistribute land, it
is still possible to formalise the obligations that tra-
ditionally legitimated land ownership (the obliga-
tion to take care of the landless) and redistribute
the product of the land via higher wages and pen-
sions. In Kerala, old-age pensions from farmers'
surpluses were mandated by the Agricultural
Workers Act of 1974. When this programme
became politically and administratively impossible,
the state took up the fiscal burden10. Security of
employment ('permanency') was the second
method, and tough minimum wage legislation the
third. Together, these rules of agriculture, and the
accompanying conflict over their enforcement,
convinced many farmers (at least in the short run)
that they should exit food production andlor move
to less labour-intensive crops than paddy At least
some of the subsequent stagnation in Kerala agri-
culture can be attributed to these dynamics
(Herring 1989).
Alongside the Kerala model there is significant
international attention to the West Bengal model. It
See, e.g. Lipton (1993). My own arguments are
developed in Herring (1983): chapters 9 and 10.
Herring 1989; Gulati 1990. Old age pensions also
improved intra-household income distribution for the
most vulnerable sections of the most vulnerable class, as
families recognised that non-working members were an
economic asset, even if a small one.
is less radical, despite being driven by the same
communist party, and more tolerable to liberal
opinion. Unlike Kerala's communists, leftist politi-
cians in Bengal decided against the abolition of
landlordism: redistributing land from all landlords
to all tenants. Instead, tenancy was regulated in the
familiar way Predictably, many of the problems of
tenancy reform produced by structural inequality
appeared in the Bengal reforms (Mallick 1993:
52-8), confirming the common findings about the
inherent weaknesses of attempts to regulate tenancy
(Herring 1983: chapters 2 and 3).
The West Bengal model does have a lesson about
political feasibility and sustainability Renouncing
radical agrarian reform kept the agrarian left coali-
tion together. By keeping sharecroppers dependent
on the local state and on the state-level regime in
Calcutta, the parties of the left retain a loyal follow-
ing in rural areas. The Kerala model of agrarian
reform accepted a rupture in the class coalition of
the left - newly landed farmers opposed to labour-
ers who demanded higher wages - and the left paid
for this strategy electorally Given the extraordinary
subordination of the landless in Kerala historically,
and the inherent difficulty of making tenancy
reform work for the poorest, there is, on balance,
more to be said for the Kerala model than the West
Bengal model.
Nevertheless, the Kerala reforms can be criticised
on a number of grounds. First, rentiers with ten-
ants were dispossessed (on about 42% of the non-
plantation arable land), but not so the de facto
functionless owners who hold land mainly for
security or speculative value and hire and supervise
labour apathetically Many of these owners have
other jobs or income sources (Herring 1989). If
land is to be rationed, their claim is weak. Taxation
policy should be able to move land into more
intensive use. Second, the land ceiling was both
too high and too restrictive (excluding plantation
crops, for example) to yield much land for distrib-
ution (though the threat of a ceiling induced some
market redistribution). Third, too much of the
redistributed land was of poor quality and recipi-
ents had too little credit to improve it. Special
efforts are necessary to provide economies of scale
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in provision of inputs and marketing of outputs for
holders of tiny parcels. Rather than worrying about
whether this is a public or private responsibility,
much more effort should be invested in ensuring
that existing public sector institutions work as they
should; there are strong political compulsions for
working through the state. Also, as Bina Agarwal
(1994) stresses more generally, land reforms must
take special consideration of the effects of patri-
archy on land control.
Productivity consequences of actual land reforms
inevitably diverge from theory; in Kerala, there is
cause for concern. The process through which
redistributive reforms in particular are achieved
accounts for much of their impact on growth.
Radical land reforms in a democracy produce sig-
nificant conflict and uncertainty In Kerala, tenants
got the land when absentee rentiers were dispos-
sessed; the payoff to the more numerous landless
labourers was limited distribution of tiny house-
hold plots (about 0.1 acres) and labour reforms
granting security of employment, ratcheted wages,
a pension fund and other benefits that were of lim-
ited use to the landless poor. These tensions pro-
duced a stalemated class conflict in the late 1970s
and early 1980s which reduced both production
and on-farm investment." Newly landed farmers
were reluctant to pay double the wage rate of sur-
rounding states and resented having a permanent
labour force working at administered wages.
Land reform may thus have serious disruptive
effects on production for some time, depending on
the social process of reform and how it is handled
politically In a land-to-the-tiller reform, there is
concern that criminalising sharecropping has nega-
tive effects in terms of insurance and risk-sharing.
Again, a staging argument about historical change is
necessary: abolition of landlordism breaks social
structures that perpetuate poverty and disable the
state. States respond to fields of power; an unre-
constructed agrarian system of dominance reduces
the degrees of freedom for the state in pursuing less
controversial pro-poor policies such as transfer
payments, education and labour reform. Re-intro-
duction of lease arrangements among equals after
a transition period should redress any negative
See Herring (1993). On the longer history of reform generated by this process have worked class
and provisions of the Act, see Herring 1983: chapters 6, compromises which augur well for future growth.
7. Patrick Heller (1994) argues that new social energies
consequences of a restricted land market. But with-
out the abolition of landlordism, agrarian systems
in which oppression is a major part of social
dynamics perpetuate poverty Land reform policy
must distinguish between socially oppressive and
exploitative landlordism and frictional tenancy
arrangements among near-equals, the latter being
conducive to efficient agriculture.
Contemporary Kerala has precisely the type of
political institutions that are often desiderata but
seemingly impossible choices for other societies.
The electorate is informed, extraordinarily partici-
patory, alert and assertive; political parties are rep-
resentative and competitive. Political behaviour
matters and institutions work. Yet these parameters
of the political system are the product of long evo-
lution, of struggle, and of reforms, social and eco-
nomic. They were born not entirely of policy choice
but through popular reaction to repression and
exclusion: landlordism, casteism, degradation of
women, slavery and untouchability Yet; policy
choices did matter. One of the means through
which institutions were developed was popular
responses to state initiatives in agrarian reform. A
reach exceeding the state's grasp encouraged mobil-
isation of newly benefited groups seeking to obtain
their de jure rights; creating coalitions of the poor
necessitated reaching across traditional social barri-
ers and extending the scope of reform. This process
was begun by a colonial state traumatised by insur-
gency - the Mappila rebellion leading to the
Malabar Tenancy Act of 1929 - and continued
through abolition of tenancy altogether in the
1970s (Herring 1988).
Kerala's remarkable record in terms of social indica-
tors has largely been viewed as a human welfare
success story, as publicised by Jean Drèze and
Amartya Sen (1989) and others, and a disaster ïn
terms of agricultural production and productivity
(e.g. Tharamangalam 1998; Kannan and
Pushpangadan 1988). If the World Bank (1997)
view of poverty in India is correct, sacrificing
growth reduces the rate of poverty decline and
depletes the resources for safety nets. I know of no
convincing way to evaluate the trade-offs, if they
exist. It is possible to stress the effects of a stale-
mated class conflict in agriculture (Herring 1989) as
a source of disinvestment or to see institution build-
ing as the source of new forms of investment (Heller
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1994). The World Bank's 1997 report on India
argues that there is no trade-off; retargeting pro-
grammes can simultaneously create growth and
human capitallsafety net development. In ethical
terms, the Kerala model is quite defensible. The
assumptions underlying the World Bank's alterna-
tive - that economic growth will trickle down, and
the elimination of popular-sector entitlements will
accelerate growth - together put the burden of risk
on the poor, and on this generation over the next. It
is hard to mount an ethical defence of so risky a
strategy
4 What is in the Politically
Feasible Choice Set?
The common argument against land reform is that
it is politically impracticable. The question must be:
impracticable compared to what? Serious pro-poor
policies in general encounter resistance and prove
difficult to sustain politically To assume that much
of any existing political system is in equilibrium,
from which moving is difficult, is to assume a con-
servative stance that prescribes doing nothing - or
tinkering at the margins. To assume that political
systems, institutions and patterns of behaviour are
infinitely malleable yields a wide range of policy
options, but has little relevance on the ground.
Political pessimists concerned with poverty may
conclude that growth is enough because responsive
states and coalitions for the poor are rare.
In assessing what is 'politically feasible', experience
cautions against blind conservatism. The disman-
tling of the Soviet empire, and the Soviet Union
itself, looked politically unthinkable before it hap-
pened. Many remained convinced that black rule in
South Africa was unimaginable, or that China
would never abandon Maoist practice. Moreover,
policy has a strategic element. Instead of seeing
public policy as a captive of existing structures and
political dynamics, analysts need to recognise
strategic elements in which new sources of support
are mobilised through policy choice. Getting to an
effective and representative political structure has a
lot to do with historical junctures and political
development over time. Path-dependency then
introduces one set of analytical problems for under-
standing either governance or poverty; a second set
is introduced by the Archimedes problem of public
policy: what assumptions do we make about the
scope and limits of public authority and the mal-
leability of political interests?'2
Poverty policy which is effective presupposes an
effective state. Some poverty is episodic, some per-
petual, some frictional. Public moral economies dif-
fer across time and space regarding the way in
which they construct different classes of poverty
and the poor. Neither growth nor agrarian reform
offers any panacea. The World Bankb World
Development Report 1997 makes the case for cen-
tring governance issues in development, but offers
little in the way of feasible mechanisms. The overtly
political problem is disagreement on the extent of
market failure and what to do about it.
Accountability transparency, and alert activism
among the citizenry all presuppose the social bases
for independent action, something a serious agrar-
ian reform facilitates in a way few other policies can.
Rapid growth may be a solution for the poor with
some assets, contacts, mobility, energy and low risk
aversion, but do nothing for the most intractable
poverty (Gaiha and Kulkarni 1998).
Alternatives to land reform are themselves imprac-
tical by demanding criteria. Transfer payments,
public works and anti-poverty programmes in India
frequently engender corruption and miss their tar-
gets, or approach them inefficiently (World Bank
1997: xix, et passim). A large part of this problem is
lack of accountability of state to citizenry Policies
which can be targeted and directly reduce poverty,
such as land reform, are superior to policies which
require continuous intervention and indirect effect
or potential for diversion. Coping with poverty
effectively presupposes governance. Otherwise
public programmes mutate into boondoggles for
the middle class, rent subsidies for the bureaucracy
and patronage for politicians.
The view of land reforms as politically impractica-
ble also misses the dynamic element of political
economy: e.g., the decline in land values in some
areas or the shifting of elite interests to urban areas.
Environmental protection offers some scope as well.
" For an ethical argument, see Herring 1983, chapter 9,
on the enabling effect of public policy towards political
potential for alleviating poverty; also Echeverri-Gent 1993.
"Barrington Moore, Jr. (1966), who significantly
subtitled his Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
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Since states are often poor protectors of land, the
scope for environmentally acceptable or positive
consequences of distribution of state lands can be
significant and clearly would reduce poverty among
beneficiaries. Experience from Kerala suggests that
the size of such plots need not be large. Mini-plots
for house-sites and gardens, less than 0.1 acres,
allow families some independence and raise the
reservation wage for agricultural labour.
Radical redistribution of land rights is, then, not
universally applicable, nor are market-friendly land
reforms inimical to the political effects stressed
above (Lipton 1993). As landholding sizes decline,
particularly important in terms of nutrition and
poverty reduction is the intensification of sub-sub-
sistence' holdings, which multiply globally
Likewise, institutional innovation for provision of
inputs and sale of products takes on particular
importance on tiny farms. The full mix of public
and private provision is yet to be effectively
exploited; new programmes of cooperativestate
collaboration in Kerala should offer new evidence.
Biotechnology has an unfulfilled role to play, requir-
ing more public governance of and attention to
intellectual property rights in biota.
But at base, the argument for agrarian reform has to
be that empowerment of the poor requires the
advances in status and independence that asset
ownership brings, and that empowerment is a nec-
essary condition for democratic gbvernance.
Otherwise, schemes for the poor will be manipu-
lated by those more powerful, to the mutual bene-
fit of state minions and the locally connected. If we
assume that state officials are rational actors, the
redistribution of power in rural areas means a rede-
finition of the field of incentives facing the state.
Since the state resists its own reformation, changing
the incentive structure makes responsiveness to the
poor more likely
On the big issues of democracy and development,
we are only beginning to have a sense of intercon-
nections.'3 Land reform has the great advantage of
'Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World',
made sweeping claims about the political importance of
breaking landed aristocracies for democratic
development - in opposition to dictatorships. In an
ambitious comparative study, Rueschemeyer, Stephens
and Stephens (1992) confirm Mooreb early findings.
empowering the least powerful, or, even if quite
limited, at least raising the reservation wage and
thus increasing bargaining power at the bottom of
society where it is weakest. The World Bank rightly
casts this argument in terms of 'investment': on its
list of what has worked to reduce poverty in India
is the large category of 'investments in people'
including 'in general, [investmentsl in their greater
ability to shape their own economic and social des-
tiny' (1997: xvi). Though the Bank report on India
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